[Sinner]

It is also fact that for the first time in American history more non combat troops have accounted for nearly half the casualties in Iraq. In the past 90 percent of the casualties were combat troops, mostly infantry. So why is that? Well it could be because infantry are better trained and equipped, American infantry do their work very well, killing more of the enemy and taking fewer casualties. Also conress in the 1990’s was under pressure to give more opportunities in the army for women. Men and women begin doing their basic training together. One of the important aspects of Basic training is to se who could handle the stress and if need be get them out of the army. Troops who break down in the chaos of combat get themselves, and others, killed.

The Military knew there would be trouble because basic training has been watered down so women can handle it. Their solution was to send recruits who signed up for combat jobs to goto special all male basic training which is old school to make sure only people who could handle the stress of combat went on to become infantry. The mixed basic training is composed of non combat troops.



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Meanwhile, the mixed basic (“basic lite”) was composed of non-combat troops. But many others who should have stayed civilians, instead went into an army job. The real problem here was that “basic lite” also failed to instill an appreciation for the importance of discipline. By the last 1990s, company commanders in non-combat units were going nuts with the growth of disciplinary problems. This extended beyond people not showing up for work on time or not following orders. Rifles were not cleaned, or fired accurately during annual weapons training. People didn’t take convoy training seriously. For the brass, it wasn’t a high priority problem, and the captains were told to cope as best they could. And they did, until 2003. All of a sudden, thousands of non-combat troops were in a combat zone, and they made a lot of mistakes. The possibility of death tends to get people’s attention, it always does. The non-combat troops got more training and more equipment. Companies that made gear for armoring a few hundred BMWs a year suddenly got orders for thousands of kits to armor hummers. Troops in Iraq scrounged armor and did it themselves. It was the old American “can-do” attitude, helped along by the risk of getting killed if you don’t.

But there as another problem. A large number of reserve troops were called up for Iraq duty. Now the reservists had joined with the understanding that they would go to active duty in the event of a major emergency, and would stay on active duty, along with everyone else, until the war was over. But Iraq was not World War 3. It was a “little war,” and reservists went over to Iraq for a year or so and went back to being civilians. But because Iraq was a dangerous place for non-combat troops, the army had to provide months of additional training to make sure the reservists had a fighting chance. Additional training centers were set up in Kuwait. Sometimes reservists were rushed over without the additional training, but the army knew that was dangerous, not just for the reservists, but for the careers of any officer caught doing that too often. Many of the reservists were proud to serve, but some, reflecting the electorate back home, did not agree with the war and didn’t believe they should be there at all. Journalists loved these guys, as they were a constant source of good tips on stories the brass could not defend themselves on. That just kept the officers on their toes.

Meanwhile, basic training was beefed up, and thousands of trucks were armored, even though this meant that many of them wore out prematurely (usually suspensions and engines) because of all the additional weight in places the vehicles were not designed to handle it. In Iraq, most of the danger was concentrated on a few roads and areas. Units operating there got priority for armored trucks and escorts. There were casualties, but many, many more were avoided because of all the protective measures. Moreover, some of the “safe” areas occasionally got unsafe. If you were driving through the well protected Green Zone of Baghdad, in an unarmored hummer, and a mortar shell landed next to your vehicle, you would get hurt. If you had been in an armored hummer, you probably would not have been hurt. But the regularly attacked routes get priority for the armored hummers. Most troops understand that. In a combat zone, it’s usually bad luck or inattention that will get you into trouble, more so than lack of equipment. Out on the road, you are taught that sharp eyes and quick reflexes are more likely to keep you safe than just piling on more armor. Most roadside bombs are discovered before they are set off. Most ambushes do more damage to the ambushers than to their targets.

But ask a G.I. driving down those roads regularly how much protection he needs, and he will say “more.” You can’t defend the soldiers commander, or Secretary Rumsfeld, in a situation like this. However, we’re not talking warfare here, but media relations and politics. So when you get asked a question for which there is no correct answer, the only alternative is to admit you’re wrong, proclaim that you will do better, and wait for it all to blow over.