The problem of infected files is closely related to the problem of faked files - faked in content or
in quality. All these problems call for similar cures: trusted sources providing the original files and publishing their signatures and the utilization of these signatures in the p2p software. This is in no way an unrealistic development target: there are good enough hash methods to provide unique and compact signatures to any sharable digital objects and upgrading the existing p2p protocols and clients to support a reasonably common signature standard should not be too hard for the programmers.
Trusted sources imply permanent, verifiable identities and an evolving network of trust relatiosnhips between them. At first this may sound like a dangerous and alien approach for an average p2p user who is (wisely) used to keep a low profile at the presence of the copyright nazis. But trust networks need and should not be public expect for those that wish to go public, including p2p-friendly artists to whom generic file signatures would give a good tool to help their
own quality rips to be distributed in the networks. For the majority of users wishing to take part in the sharing in high privacy the root level technology (encryption, IP hiding etc.) should provide just that - a safe and enjoyable sharing environment with full control over one's sharing, privacy and forming of trusted personal relationships.
- tg
